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Abstract: In this paper, we use agent-based modeling (ABM) to study dierent obstacles to the expansion of
contract rice farming in the context of Mekong Delta (MKD)’s rice supply chain. ABM is a bottom-up approach
formodeling thedynamicsof interactionsamong individuals andcomplex combinationsof various factors (e.g.,
economic, social or environmental). Our agent-based contract farming model focuses on two critical compo-
nents of contractual relationship, namely financial incentives and trust. We incorporate the actual recurrent
fluctuationsof spotmarketprices,which induceboth contractor and farmeragents to renegeon theagreement.
The agent-based model is then used to predict emergent system-wide behaviors and compare counterfactual
scenarios of dierent policies and initiatives on maintaining the contract rice farming scheme. Simulation re-
sults firstly show that a fully-equipped contractor who opportunistically exploits a relatively small proportion
(less than 10%) of the contracted farmers in most instances can outperform spot market-based contractors in
terms of average profit achieved for each crop. Secondly, a committed contractor who oers lower purchas-
ing prices than the most typical rate can obtain better earnings per ton of rice as well as higher profit per crop.
However, those contractors in both cases could not enlarge their contract farming scheme, since either farmers’
trust toward themdecreases gradually or their oers are unable to competewith thebenefits fromacompetitor
or the spotmarket. Thirdly, the results are also in agreement with the existing literature that the contract farm-
ing scheme is not a cost-eective method for buyers with limited rice processing capacity, which is a common
situation among the contractors in the MKD region. These results yield significant insights into the diiculty in
expanding the agricultural contracting program in the MKD’s rice supply chain.
Keywords: Agent-Based Modeling, Contract Farming, Agricultural Supply Chain, Computational Simulation
Introduction
1.1 Contract farming, which is a form of vertical coordination among agricultural supply chain actors, is common
practice in agriculture all around the world (Eaton & Shepherd 2001). Its use has recently been expanding, par-
ticularly in Asia and Africa (Shepherd 2013; Swinnen & Maertens 2007). Contract farming presents a particular
contractual relationship in which farmers produce and deliver designated agricultural commodities and con-
tractors acquire the commodities at a predetermined price (Eaton & Shepherd 2001; Swinnen &Maertens 2007;
Shepherd 2013). On one hand, it is of interest to contractors who seek guaranteed outputs of high quality and
with consistency. On the other hand, the use of agricultural contracts has become attractive to many small-
holder farmers, since the arrangement can assure stable income and access to reliable markets in the modern
food supply chain. However, the implementationof contractingprogramshas several potential risks thatwould
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lead to the failure of honoring the agreement from both sides, may it be a contractor or a farmer (Prowse 2012;
Shepherd 2013; Will 2015), as this was the case in the Mekong Delta (MKD) region of Vietnam.
1.2 The contract rice farming scheme was first applied in Vietnam in 2002 under Decision 80, also known as the
“linking together the four house” model, to increase the use of agricultural contracts and promote techno-
logical innovation in the rural economy within the country (UNIDROIT 2014). Despite the eort, contract rice
farming in the MKD region was unsuccessful withmany reported cases of unilateral breaches by either the con-
tractors or farmers (Roberts&Khiem2005; Khiem&Emor2005). In 2013, the VietnameseGovernmentproposed
a “large-scale paddy field”model under Decision 62 to pursue a sustainable implementation of the agricultural
contracting program. This program under Decision 62 was considered a promising approach in the context of
MKD’s rice supply chain, given the fact that several existing constraints of Decision80were addressedwith a few
successful case studies (Can 2014; Ngan et al. 2015). However, the program expansion has been comparatively
slow, with only 11% of total available paddy land in the region currently covered by it (Vietnam Farmer Union
2017; VietnamTelevision 2017). Understanding barriers to the growth of this contracting program is thus crucial
for the Vietnamese Government and local authorities.
1.3 Generally speaking, thereare threemainobstacles to theexpansionof thecontract farmingscheme in theMKD’s
rice supply chain. Firstly, many contractors failed to build trust and invest in long-term relationships with the
participants. This lack of trust leads to a low rate of contract farming success (Oxfam Vietnam 2012; Dung 2014).
Secondly, several studies revealed that low prices oered from paddy contracts lead to a low rate of participa-
tion as well as high rates of breaches from small-holder farmers (Roberts & Khiem 2005; Khiem & Emor 2005).
Thirdly, according toWorldBank (2013), opportunities for the contractual relationship are limited to enterprises
who are not equipped with the required rice processing capacity.
1.4 In this paper, we aim to study these three specific issues from the contractor perspective and understand how
they impede the success of contract rice farming. We utilize agent-based modeling (ABM), which is well-suited
for capturing the dynamics of interactions among individuals and complex combinations of dierent factors
(Bonabeau 2002; An 2012). The strength of ABM is that it is able to predict emergent system-wide behaviors and
compare various viable scenarios of dierent policies, interventions and initiatives, which cannot be observed
through empirical studies or statistical analysis alone.
1.5 ABM has been widely used to address problems in supply chain management since the 1990s (Labarthe et al.
2007;Oliveira et al. 2016). It has also gainedpopularity in the research field of agricultural supply chainmanage-
ment (Higgins et al. 2010; Hilletoh & Lättilä 2012; Krejci & Beamon 2012) and agricultural policy analysis (Zim-
mermann et al. 2009; Kremmydas et al. 2018; Ambekar et al. 2015). However, limited use of ABM approaches
can be found in the existing literature on contract farming. To the best of our knowledge, there are only three
previous studies, by Handayati et al. (2017), Verwaart et al. (2016), and Khanh et al. (2017), applying ABM to
contractual programs of dierent crops in Indonesia, Kenya, and Vietnam, respectively.
1.6 The agent-based model used in this study is an extension of the model proposed by Khanh et al. (2017). Here,
we focus on the perspective of contractors in the context of theMKD’s rice supply chain. The context is designed
to have the competition of contractors in establishing their contract farming scheme. In a region where agro-
ecological factors favor specific rice varieties, farmers have a choice of engagingwithmultiple potential buyers.
The model is also extended with the introduction of a spot market, in which both farmers and contractors can
break the contract to trade with local collectors. These opportunistic behaviors are induced by the volatile
nature of recurrent fluctuations in the rice prices in the region.
1.7 Dierent combinations of counterfactual scenarios of the contractor’s commitment level, higher oered rate of
the contracting price over the spot market price, and availability of rice processing facilities, which correspond
to the above-mentioned three obstacles, are then examined. Insights gained from the agent-based model can
be beneficial for policy-makers and researchers in Vietnam to understand the diiculties in expanding the con-
tracting program in the MKD’s rice supply chain. Besides that, the model may also be of interest to academic
scholars who are keen to apply ABM in agricultural supply chain and contract farming related research.
Background and Motivation
Rice supply chain and spot market
2.1 The MKD region plays a central role in Vietnam’s food security both domestically and internationally. Over the
past decade, the MKD has accounted for approximately half of Vietnam’s total rice production. The bulk of the
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Figure 1: A traditional rice supply chain in the MKD region
MKD’s expanded rice production has accounted for 95% of Vietnam’s rice exports, a major factor in Vietnam
becoming one of the major rice exporting countries in the world (VEPR 2015).
2.2 However, theMKD rice systemhas remained underdeveloped fromboth the physical and institutional perspec-
tives (World Bank 2011). Most of the rice in the region is undierentiated and of low quality. Figure 1 shows a
traditional rice supply chain in theMKDwith six actors between the farm gate and final consumers. It features a
modest level of horizontal and vertical coordination (World Bank, 2011). Informal commercial ties are common
between local collectors and other supply chain players both in upstream and downstream ends. According
to Loc & Son (2013), more than 93% of total paddy produced by farmers were sold to collectors from the spot
market, and only 4.2%was delivered directly to exporters (shown in Figure 1).
2.3 The spotmarket has long played a key role connecting farmerswith downstreamplayers. TheMKDhas an inter-
lacing drainage and irrigation canal systems serving as the main means for transportation. Rice production in
theMKD is fragmented, comprising approximately 1.46million farmerswho growpaddy ricemostly inmarginal
and small fields (Chen et al. 2015). It would be costly and less convenient for the processors or exporters to buy
directly from individual farmers. Local collectors are more eicient in gathering and transporting paddy from
the fields to the market.
Contract rice farming
2.4 According to International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2016), contract farming is a form of vertical
coordinationamongagricultural supply chainactors. Twopolesof the institutional coordinationcontinuumare
open spotmarkets and vertical integration (Minot 1986; Peterson 2001). The former is the simplest institutional
mode of vertical coordination, in which there are no advanced agreements of purchase of agricultural produce
between farmers and buyers. The latter is where all supply chain stages ranging from production, processing
to distribution are carried out by one firm.
2.5 Contract farming presents a particular contractual relationship inwhich the farmers produce and deliver desig-
natedagricultural commodities,while thecontractoracquires thecommoditiesatapredeterminedprice (Eaton
& Shepherd 2001; Swinnen & Maertens 2007; Shepherd 2013). The benefits for farmers and firms are clear and
convincing. However, there are also potential disincentives that lead to the failure of honoring the contract
agreement fromboth sides (Prowse 2012; Shepherd 2013; Will 2015), as this was the case in the implementation
of contract rice farming in the MKD region.
“Linking together the four house”model
2.6 Contract farmingwas first implemented inVietnamunderDecisionNo.80/2002/QD-CP (Decision80). Alsoknown
as the “linking together the four house” policy, Decision 80 was one of the few explicit governmental attempts
to improve the vertical linkage between small-holder farmers and exporters. The contract farming schemewas
expected to be an eective way to drawmillions of small farmers in the MKD region into a commercialized sup-
ply chain (Asian Development Bank 2007).
2.7 However, contract rice farming application under Decision 80 was largely unsuccessful in the MKD (Roberts &
Khiem 2005; Khiem & Emor 2005; Dung 2014; UNIDROIT 2014). The proportion of contract sale was compara-
tively low. In An Giang, the first province to actively promote the contract farmingmodel, 90% of signed paddy
contracts were not fulfilled (Roberts & Khiem 2005; Khiem & Emor 2005). Only for some agricultural products
with high processing requirements such as sugarcane, milk, and cigarette, the share of sale from agricultural
contracts reached 30% (UNIDROIT 2014).
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Figure 2: The contract rice farming model in the MKD region
2.8 Breaches of contracts were common from both contractors and farmers (Roberts & Khiem 2005; UNIDROIT
2014). Farmers reneged on contracts when they were oered with a higher price and/or more eicient buying
arrangement from paddy collectors. The farmers refused to deliver paddy and declined to repay the advances
on inputs provided at the beginning of a cropping season. Large buyers were also reported to have failed to
honor the contract. They delayed the purchase to manipulate prices and forced farmers to sell at a lower price
or tightened the quality standard to reject excessed paddy (Roberts & Khiem 2005).
“Large-scale paddy field”model
2.9 To address the existing constraints in Decision 80 and pursue a sustainable practice, the Vietnamese Govern-
ment has proposed the “large-scale paddy field” model under Decision 62/2013/QD-TTG. Decision 62 clearly
specifies the obligations of related parties in the vertical cooperation, in which farmers, organizations of farm-
ers and contractors/enterprises are the main subjects. It also provides a supportive enabling environment,
which includes capital sources for conducting assistant policies (Pham & La 2014; Viet 2015).
2.10 Figure 2 shows the design of a contract rice farming model, which is based on the case of An Giang Plant Pro-
tection Joint Stock Company (Ngan et al. 2015). A “large-scale paddy field” is established when the contractor
coordinates a group of small farmers and forms an aggregated large area in order to pursue eiciency andmax-
imize profit. Farmers might receive a production loan and technical support to apply environmental-friendly
growingmethods and produce high-quality rice. The contractors subsequently attain a stable supply source of
high-value paddy rice and then trade in the international market. The profits would be shared between con-
tracted farmers through an increased farm-gate price and the contractors to compensate the services provided
to farmers and operational activities (Can 2014).
2.11 Although advantages of participating in contractual agreement are obvious for the related parties, progress in
the expansion of the contract farming scheme in the MKD region under Decision 62 has been comparatively
slow (VietnamFarmer Union 2017; VietnamTelevision 2017). It is reported that only 11% of total available paddy
land has been used for contract farming. Cases of unilateral breaches from both sides have also been reported
(Vietnam Television 2017).
Problems of contract rice farming
2.12 There are three main problems leading to the failure of Decision 80 or slow progress in the expansion of De-
cision 62 of contract rice farming in the MKD. Firstly, many contractors in the region failed to build trust and
invest in long-term relationships with farmers, resulting in a low rate of contract farming success (Dung 2014;
UNIDROIT 2014). According to Fafchamps (2003), Shepherd (2013) and Will (2015), trust is the most basic and
important factor in preventing opportunistic behavior and leading to the success of the contracting agreement.
A trust-based relationship between contractors and farmers is also critical in expanding the number of produc-
ers involved in the contract farming scheme. Contractors in the MKD are claimed to fail to remain trustworthy
by honoring contract obligations when there is an unexpected fluctuation of the market price at the end of the
cropping season (Roberts & Khiem 2005; UNIDROIT 2014; Vietnam Television 2017).
2.13 Secondly, from world experience, the agricultural contracting scheme is not a cost-eective method for ev-
ery product (Bijman 2008; Will 2015). Contract farming is commonly found in high-value commodities such as
tobacco, sugarcane, coee, and tea. Growing these commodities, large-scale buyers have more incentive to
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obtain specific product features, organize good agriculture methods and sell the harvesting at a higher profit
margin (Minot 1986). Asmost of the rice grown in theMKDwasof lowvalue, the issueof rice quality andprocess-
ing are not critical. The contract rice farming scheme may be disadvantageous compared to the spot market,
due to high levels of transaction cost in coordinating small-holder farmers. Studies by Khiem & Emor (2005)
revealed that oered prices from paddy contracts were usually unable to compete with the benefits provided
by collectors in the openmarket, leading to high rates of contract failure.
2.14 Thirdly, according toWorldBank (2013), theopportunities for thecontractual relationship in theMKDare limited
by husking, milling and polishing capacity of export firms who are interested and able to provide the package
of support. A realistic cost-benefit analysis for the contract farming is particularly crucial to create a viable
business for the large enterprises as well as a sustainable livelihood for small-holder farmers (Shepherd 2013;
Will 2015).
Related work using ABM
2.15 ABM is a discrete-event simulation framework that focuses on a population of autonomous and interacting
agents. Each individual agent is defined by a distinct set of attributes and behaviors. The agents act on their
own rules that allow them to observe, and make changes in response to the interaction with other agents and
the environment they are located (North & Macal 2007; Gilbert 2008). The strength of ABM is that it allows
a bottom-up approach to model how individuals make decisions in a complex system and predict emergent
system-wide behaviors resulting from the interaction and adaptation among those agents (Bonabeau 2002; An
2012; Grimm & Railsback 2011).
2.16 ABMhas recently gainedpopularity in the research field of agricultural supply chainmanagement (Higgins et al.
2010; Hilletoh & Lättilä 2012; Krejci & Beamon 2012) and agricultural policy analysis (Zimmermann et al. 2009;
Kremmydas et al. 2018; Ambekar et al. 2015). It is a well-suited technique to capture and handle stochastic and
dynamic features of the behavior and interaction among supply chain actors aswell as the economic aspects of
dierent supply chain processes. It also has the capability to incorporate external uncertainties fromanoutside
environment, including the impact of natural events and the eects of political and social situations, on the
decisions of related agricultural supply chain members (Krejci & Beamon 2012; Kremmydas et al. 2018).
2.17 However, limited use of ABM approaches can be found in the existing literature of contract farming. Much of
the research on contracting agreements in agriculture is either empirical or case-based studies, with only a few
focusing on analytical models (Huh & Lall 2013; Federgruen et al. 2015). Handayati et al. (2017) applied ABM in
contract farming of tomatoes in the Pangalengan region, Indonesia. They examined how dierent scenarios of
contract farming together with farmer commitment aect the supply chain performance, measured by farmer
profits and service levels. Another agent-based model of inclusive business, also known as agricultural con-
tracting, was proposed by Verwaart et al. (2016). The purpose of thismodel is to evaluate the inclusive business
project in the context of agricultural contracts between a local sorghum processor and small-holder farmers
in the Meru County, Kenya. Opportunistic behavior of farmers was explicitly modeled with the expected utility
of selling produce and the mutual trust among related parties. Parameters of trust, trust development, hon-
esty and risk attitude of the farmers were estimated through behavioral economics games. Khanh et al. (2017)
presented a contract farming model of the MKD’s rice supply chain with the use of ABM. The decision-making
process of both farmer and contractor agents was based on two factors: cost-benefit analysis and the role of
trust. Preliminary results of how farmer and contractor agents’ commitments impact on contracting program
performance were discussed. The agent-based model introduced in this study, viewed as an extension of the
model proposed by Khanh et al. (2017), focuses on the three obstacles of the expansion of contract rice farming
in the MKD region from the perspective of large-scale contractors.
ABM of Contract Rice Farming
Model design
Contract farming process
3.1 The model includes two types of agents: farmers and contractors, who are involved directly with the contract
farming scheme. Figure 3 presents two stages of the contractual program, pre-harvesting and post-harvesting,
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Figure 3: Contract rice farming in the MKD region
in one cropping season. The process is based on the analysis of contract farming practice in the MKD region as
well as the conceptual contract farming framework in developing countries proposed by Barrett et al. (2012).
3.2 In the pre-harvesting stage, contractors and farmers communicate to establish a contractual relationship. Each
contractor determines how to coordinate adjacent farmers into the large-scale paddy field program to fulfil
their exporting volume. Pre-harvesting contracts are only initiated when a farmer accepts one of the oers.
The contracted farmer obtains technical support to apply sustainable cultivation methods and is required to
deliver and sell paddy back to the contractor. The contracted farmer also receives verified paddy seeds for the
production as a financial loan from the buyer. A non-contracted farmer, who either declines or receives no oer,
grows paddy with traditional practice and trade in the spot market.
3.3 In thepost-harvestingstage, farmersandcontractorsobservechanges in spotmarketpricesanddecidewhether
to honor or break the contract. If a farmer decides to breach the contract, they can sell to a local collector at a
higher spot market price. If the contractor decides to infringe the contract, they can force contracted farmers
to sell at a lower contract price than the pre-determined price. If there is no breach by either party, the pre-
harvesting contract remains. The farmer sells the harvested paddy and returns the loan to the contractor. The
contractor then acquires revenue by exporting polished rice to international buyers. It is assumed that small-
holder farmers sell all harvested paddy to buyers, i.e., either contractors or local collectors.
Decisionmaking rules
3.4 Agents in the model are assumed to be boundedly rational, making decisions based on preference rankings,
which are expressed in scores over potential trading partners. The score calculation that agent i assigns to
agent j at time t is the Cobb-Douglas functional form of utility and trust adapted to the proposed function by
Klos & Nooteboom (2001) and Nooteboom (2015):
scoreij(t) = (utilityij(t))
βi · (trustij(t))1−βi , (1)
where scoreij(t) is the score agent i allocates to agent j, and utilityij(t) is the utility value mapped from the
benefitmij(t) that agent i earns in the partnership with agent j, while trustij(t) is agent i’s trust in agent j.
βi ∈ [0, 1] is a weight to measure preference of utility over trust for agent i. βi is assumed to be fixed during
simulation run.
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3.5 The utility value is expressed in an exponential utility function that is scaled in the range from zero to one (Gar-









wheremi(min)(t) andmi(max)(t) are the benefit levels at which agent i has minimum and maximum benefits
during the simulation. Ri, the risk tolerance of agent i, is basically the amount of risk that agent i is willing to
take. It is assumed that all agents are risk-averse, and utilityij is concave for all values ofmij (Krejci & Beamon
2015). Risk tolerance Ri for both farmer and contractor agents is set tomi(max). Agents in the model tend to
prefer partnerships in which they can achieve higher expected utilities. This rational behavior is attenuated by
the introduction of trust relationships that aect the decisions of agents.
3.6 Equation 3 defines an adaptive trust process between two agents in their ongoing relationship, as presented by
Klos & Nooteboom (2001):
trustij(t) = bij(t) + (1− bij(t)) ·
(
1− 1
fCF · nij(t) + 1− fCF
)
, (3)
where bij(t) ∈ [0, 1] is the trust base of agent i towards agent j, nij(t) is the number of successful trades the
agents have involved together, and parameter fCF is the trust factor, determining the pace at which the trust
relationship has developed. The calculated trustij(t) is also between zero andone. In thismodel, it is assumed
that if both parties honor rather than break the contract, mutual trust will increase (Gulati 1995), as shown in
the Figure 4. The trust base level between agents reflects a foundation of trust, which is an institutional feature
of a society (Nooteboom 1999).
Figure 4: Trust increases when agents exhibit trustworthy behavior
Contractor contract oer
3.7 Each contractor, at thepre-harvesting stageof each crop tpre, firstly identifies all prospective farmers, which are
located within their farming coverage, uC . The buyer, in each round, sends agricultural contracts to farmers,
who are located in the range of ūC further from their location, to achieve their targeted purchasing rice vol-
ume. The contract farming proposal continues until either the contractor’s objective is fulfilled or the farming
coverage is reached to the limit, uC . The contractor is also modeled to repeat the oering one more time with
dierent prospective farmers in the same round to reflect their eort to establish the aggregated paddy grown
area.
3.8 The contractor, in each oer round, calculates the benefit they earn through the contract with the farmers.
Contractor i agrees to purchase harvesting from farmer j at proposed price pij(tpre), processes the dry paddy
into export-ready rice, and eventually gains revenue by selling to international buyers. The exporting price,
πCF , is assumed to be fixed during the simulation run.
mij(tpre) = (πCF − pij(tpre)− copr) · qj − gj,k · cp,k · lCF − gj,k · co,CF (4)
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3.9 The oered price, pij(tpre), at the pre-harvesting stage, is based on the contractor’s prediction of spot market
price pSM (tpre), with a certain higher rateλi. Both the contractor and farmer agents aremodeled to predict the
spot market price at time tpre to be the average of the actual spot market price of the last two seasons.
pij(tpre) = pSM (tpre) · (1 + λi) (5)
3.10 In the large-scale paddy field program, all participating farmers are assumed to acquire the crop yield and incur
production costs in the large-scale farmer category regardless of their actual farm size. The volume of rice, qj
delivered by farmer j aer the conversion, is estimated as:
qj = vlarge · gj · rconv (6)
3.11 The contractor, at this stage, assumes that contracted farmers will commit to the agreement without any breaches.
Following Equations (1), (2), and (3), contractor i calculates the scoreij(tpre) it allocates to farmer j. The con-
tractor then sends contracts to the farmers, who are allocated with the highest score (sorted in descending
order) and historically did not breach past contracts, to gather its targeted volume demand.
Farmer contract acceptance
3.12 In the pre-harvesting stage, each farmer always has an option to cultivate the paddy by themselves. They re-
ceive a credit lSM paid in advance from a local collector, on the condition that they sell the harvested paddy to
the trader in the post-harvesting stage. Farmer i calculates the potential benefit,mi,SM (t), with the predicted
spot market price, pSM (tpre), crop yield, vk, production cost, cp,k, in accordance to their farm size type k:
mi,SM (tpre) = pSM (tpre) · vk · (1 + lSM ) · gi − cp,k · gi (7)
3.13 The farmer might also have oered contracts. The benefit,mij(tpre), of farmer i is their expected profit from
the contract farming scheme plus the production loan received from a large buyer j. The profit is presumed
to be reduced by the autonomy premium, αi, which represents how strongly the farmer values their ability to
work independently (Key & MacDonald 2006; Krejci & Beamon 2015). To keep themodel simple, a value of ai is
initially assigned to each farmer and remains the same during simulation runs.
mij(tpre) =
(pji(tpre) · vlarge − cp,large) · gi
1 + αi
+ cp,large · gi · (1 + lCF ) (8)
3.14 The farmer then evaluates all available options and proceeds with the one yielding the highest score. In case
the farmer considers engaging in a contractual relationship, theywill later decide to honor or break the contract
since the predicted spot market price, pSM (tpre), at the initial crop might be dierent from the later trading
price, pSM (tpost).
Farmer decision to honor the contract
3.15 In the post-harvesting stage, if a farmer commits to the initial agreement, they deliver and expect to sell the
harvested produce at the pre-determined price, pji(tpre). They also return the production loan borrowed from
contractor j.
mij,honor(tpost) =
(pji(tpre) · vlarge − cp,large) · gi
1 + αi
(9)
3.16 If a farmer decides to breach the contract, they sell to a local collector at a higher spotmarket price, pSM (tpost),
and decline to repay the loan. pSM (tpost) is randomly selected among the trading prices in the harvesting pe-
riod.
3.17 A dishonoring farmer also considers future trade suspension with the breached contractor (Fafchamps 2003).
The benefit that farmer i considers in this option will be decreased by the value of the loss relationship with
contracted partner j:
mij,breach(tpost) =
(pSM (tpost) · vlarge − cp,large) · gi
1 + αi
− θF ·mij,loss (10)
where θF is the number of future cropping seasons that the farmer expects to be in the contractual relationship
with thepartner.mij,loss is thedierencebetween thebenefit farmer imightearn fromthat trading relationship
with contracted partner j and from the second-best option available to them in the pre-harvesting stage.
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3.18 The trust value in the contract honoring option is updatedwith Equation (3), while the trust value in the breach-
ing option is trustSM . If farmer i decides to renege on the contract, the breached contractor, j, will set their
trust base in farmer i to bji(min) = 0 and the number of trades to initial value nji = 0.
Contractor decision to honor the contract
3.19 Aer farmer j complies with the agreement, contractor i decides either to honor or breach the contract. The
trust value towards the farmer in both choices is updated with trustij = 1, since the farmer has already deliv-
ered the harvested paddy and returned the production loan to the contractor.
3.20 If contractor idecides to infringe thecontract, they force thecontracted farmer, j, to sell at a lower contractprice
reflecting the reduction in the current spot market price. The new contracting price, pij(tpost), is be based on
the average of spot market prices during a three-month post-harvesting time. The contractor’s benefit at the
post-harvesting stage,mij(tpost), is computed according to Equation (11). In case the contractor reneges on the
previous contract, the breached farmer will set their trust base value in the contractor bji = 0, and the number
of trades together nji = 0.
mij(tpost) = (πCF − pij(tpost)− copr) · qj − gj,k · cCF (11)
3.21 If the contractor commits to the agreement, the benefit in this honoring option is calculated with Equation (11)
using the pre-determined price, pij(tpre), instead of the lower breaching price, pij(tpost). The number of trades
from both sides, nij and nji, then increases by 1 to indicate the growing trust.
Farmer trust update and contractor demand update
3.22 At the end of a cropping season, the farmer updates their trust in the contractor partners through communi-
cation within the neighborhood defined by the range, uF . The trust-base level of farmer i will be reduced to a
certain extent if there is dishonoring behavior from a large buyer j with their neighboring farmers. At the same
time, farmer imight have higher trust in contractor j if their neighbors successfully contracted with the buyer.
The change of trust-based level depends on the number of adjacent farmers who have negative or positive ex-
perience with contractor j over the total neighbors of farmer i.
bij(t+ 1) = bij(t) · (1−
nbreach
ntotal
) · (1 + nhonor
ntotal
) (12)
3.23 Each contractor, at the end of the season, ismodeled to adjust their targeted rice demand for the following crop
based on the performance of their contract farming scheme in the prior crops. The large buyer calculates their
targeted rice demand as the average of total rice volume achieved through their agricultural contracts in the
previous two seasons. If the contractor completely fulfills their objective in the last two crops, the demand is




3.24 Rice production in the MKD is fragmented, comprising approximately 1.46 million farmers who grow paddy in
small fields, with the average size of 1.29 hectares (ha) (World Bank 2011). Small-holder farmer agents in the
model can be classified into three categories on the basis of their farm size: marginal (0.5-1 ha), small (1-2 ha),
andmedium (2-3 ha) farmers (Chen et al. 2015). The farmer agents can be further divided into two groups, non-
contracted and contracted farmers, which are derived from their participation in the contract farming scheme.
3.25 Non-contracted farmers usually apply traditional cultivationmethods with an excessive amount of seed, fertil-
izer, pesticides, and herbicides. In contrast, contracted farmers are required by the contractors to pursue better
crop husbandry with fewer inputs in order to save costs and produce higher yield. Crop yields and production
costs were collected from aWorld Bank (2013) research report in the An Giang province, one of the provinces in
the MKD region. The data is for ordinary rice, which is of low value, and jasmine rice, which is considered to be
among one of the highest quality varieties grown in the region.
3.26 There are twomajor cropping seasons, Winter-Spring (WS) and Summer-Autumn (SA) crops, in the MKD region
(FAO 2017). Jasmine paddy is not grown in the SA season, since frequent floods occur during the harvesting




Parameter Description WS SA WS SA WS SA
crop crop crop crop crop crop
g Farm size (ha) [0.5 − 1] [1 − 2]/[2 − 3] Large-scale
v
Crop yield - ordinary rice (ton/ha) 6.08 4.68 6.75 5.2 7.40 5.75
Crop yield - jasmine rice (ton/ha) 6.38 7.09 7.77
cp
Production cost - ordinary rice 21.777 16.522 20.536 15.461 18.532 13.653
(million VND/ha)
Production cost - jasmine rice 23.257 22.336 19.083
(million VND/ha)
θF Commitment level Triangular Distribution [0.0, 2.0, 4.0]
uF Farmer neighborhood range 50
lSM
Rate of loan (over the total value of 0.15
produce) from the spot market
α Autonomy premium Uniform Distribution [0.1 − 1.0]
βF Weight attached to utility over trust Uniform Distribution [0.1 − 0.9]
bij(t0) Initial trust base of farmer i to contractor j Uniform Distribution [0.1 − 0.5]
nij(t0)
Initial number of trades between 0
farmer i and contractor j
Table 1: Parameters of farmer agents
period, while ordinary paddy is cultivated in both crops (World Bank 2013). The crop yield and production cost
data for each type of rice, grown in each cropping season, and in accordance with dierent farmer groups and
categories, is shown in Table 1.
3.27 According to Nhan et al. (2015) and Viet (2015), one of the critical reasons the small-holder farmers in the MKD
region decline to participate in the contract farming scheme is that they lost their autonomy of independent
production. The autonomy premium, αi, is assigned to each farmer agent i following a uniform distribution
between [0.1, 1.0]1.
3.28 It is presumed that farmer agents tend to have an unreliable business attitude, since there have been breaches
by small-holder producers reported in contract rice farming in the MKD region (Roberts & Khiem 2005; Khiem
& Emor 2005; Dung 2014; Vietnam Television 2017). The low level of commitment of the farmer agent, nF , is
randomized followinga triangulardistribution [0, 2.0, 4.0]. It implies that the longest/maximumtime the farmer
agent commits in the contractual relationship is 4 cropping seasons.
3.29 Because of the past failure of contract farming under Decision 80 (as mentioned in Section Contract rice farm-
ing), the farmer agents are assumed to have low trust in the success of the large-scale paddy field program.
The trust base of farmer i toward contractor j, bij(t0), is randomly determined at the start of each simulation
run and varies between [0.1, 0.5]. Since there is no empirical study of how small-holder farmers in the MKD
region value utility over trust, the weight parameter, βF , is assigned to each farmer agent, utilizing a uniform
distribution in the range of [0.1, 0.9]2.
Contractor agent
3.30 At the pre-harvesting stage, the contractor gives verified paddy seeds as a financial loan to farmers, accounting
for 7.5% of the total production cost (Loc & Son 2013; Viet 2015). Contracted farmers are assumed to return the
loanaer selling the crops to thebuyer. The contractor also incurs theoperational overhead,which is the cost of
hiring workers to support contracted farmers with technical practice (World Bank 2013). At the post-harvesting
stage, the contractor processes the harvested dry paddy into polished rice and exports to international buyers.
Rice conversion rate rconv is specified at 0.5 for ordinary rice in both crops and 0.48 for jasmine rice in the WS
season. The rate is applied for 5% broken, color graded exporting rice (World Bank 2013).
3.31 The cost of husking,milling andpolishing activities for both rice varietieswere extracted froma research report,
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Ordinary Jasmine
Parameter Description Rice Rice
k(t0) Initial purchasing demand (tons) 4000
rd Increasing rate of rice demand 0.1
ūC Range contractors considered in each oer round 100
uC Contractor farming coverage 500
lCF Rate of loan (over production cost) to farmers 0.075
co,CF Overheads in organizing contract farming (million VND/ton) 0.408
ch,SM Husking cost in the spot market (million VND/ton) 1.225 1.737
cm,SM Milling cost in the spot market (million VND/ton) 1.066 1.899
ch,CF Husking cost with contractors’ facilities (million VND/ton) 0.734 0.938
cm,CF Milling cost with contractors’ facilities (million VND/ton) 0.725 1.158
ce Exporting cost (million VND/ton) 0.52
πSM Exporting price for spot market rice (million VND/ton) 8.761 12.933
πCF Exporting price for contract farming rice (million VND/ton) 9.596 13.350
βC Weight contractor attached to utility over trust 0.9
bij(t0) Initial trust base of contractor i to farmer j 0.5
nij(t0) Initial number of trades between contractor i and farmer j 0
Table 2: Parameters of contractor agents
conducted by the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD 2014) during
a field trip in An Giang. Exporters associated with the contract farming scheme could also negotiate a better
price with buyers because of greater control over the quality of rice. The exporting prices, π, for two types of
rice either from the spot market or contract farming program are taken fromWorld Bank (2013).
3.32 Since large buyers coordinate the contract farming scheme to pursue higher and stable profit, the parameter
βC = 0.9 is fixed for contractor agents. The initial trust base level of contractor i in farmer j is set neutrally at
bij(t0) = 0.5. If an agent, either a contractor or a farmer, considers to trade with local collectors, its trust in the
spot market is fixed, trustSM = 0.9, to reflect a well-established conventional relationship in the MKD region.
The trust factor remains at fCF = 0.5 during the simulation run for both farmer and contractor agents.
Experiments and Results
Experiment setup
4.1 Our agent-based model was implemented in Java using the MASON framework (Luke et al. 2005). Its code can
be found on the CoMSES Network website at https://goo.gl/QhLbEY. We ran the simulation 18 steps for
ordinary rice and 9 steps for jasmine rice, with each step representing one cropping season. All simulation
steps were repeated for 500 independent Monte Carlo trials.
4.2 At the start of every Monte Carlo simulation, 3000 farmer agents were created. The proportions of marginal,
small, and medium farmers were 54.4%, 32.1%, and 13.5%, respectively. These values were calculated based
on research reports from the MKD region (IPSARD 2014; Chen et al. 2015). The simulation model incorporated
two contractor agents implementing contract farming activities. All agents were located in a continuous space
of size 1000 by 1000 representing a geographic region. Farmer agents were randomly located, while the two
contractor agents were set with specific locations: (250,500),(750,500). The locations of agents were set to
resemble an agricultural landscape in developing countries, where small-holder producers typically scatter
throughout the region while large buyers are located in convenient spots (Chen et al. 2015).
4.3 All parameters of individual farmer and contractor agents were initialized according to the values in Table 1 and
Table 2. Among those parameters, the trust base bij , the number of successful trades nij between agent i and
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Units: million VND/ton
Figure 5: Monthly spot market prices of dry ordinary paddy from 2009 to 2017
agent j, and the purchasing demand k of contractor agents were updated dynamically during the simulation
run. The other listed parameters were set with fixed values.
4.4 Available data of monthly spot market prices of dry ordinary paddy in the An Giang province from 2009 to 2017
was gathered from the Information Centre for Agriculture and Rural Development (AgroInfo 2017). Figure 5
shows the volatility of trading prices in the MKD’s ordinary rice supply chain (Chen et al. 2015) with recurrent
fluctuations over a nine-year period. For jasmine dry paddy, because of the lack of data, the spotmarket prices
were calculated based on the assumption that they are 1.4million VND/ton higher than the dry ordinary paddy
prices (World Bank 2013). For simplicity’s sake, the dry paddy price traded over the spot market in each crop
was calculated as the average of prices in three-month harvest. The harvesting periods were from February to
April for the WS crop, and from August to October for the SA crop (FAO 2017). Besides that, the forecast spot
market prices, pSM (tpre), at the pre-harvesting stage of the first two crops t1 and t2 in Equation (5), were set
equal to the median value of actual spot market prices during the nine-year period.
4.5 We used the agent-based model to examine three main obstacles of the expansion of contract rice farming in
the MKD region from the perspective of large-scale buyers (i.e., contractors). Three corresponding parameters
of the contractor agent used for the simulation experiments are as follows:
• Level of commitment θC in terms of the percentage of contracted farmers that the large buyers breach
the contractual relationship with;
• Higher rates of the contracting price over the spot market price, λ, that the contractor oers to the farm-
ers;
• Availability of rice processing facilities, δ.
4.6 Dierent scenario-based values of these three parameters were examined, as shown in Table 3. The values
remained the same during the simulation steps of each Monte Carlo run. In every simulation experiment, one
of the two contractor agents – Contractor A as can be seen in Table 3 – was set with fixed values for the three
scenario-basedparameters. The contractorwasmodeled tobe constantly committed toall farmer agents, θC =
0%. The proposed contract price by this contractor was set at the most typical (higher) rates in the MKD region
withλ = 0.2 for ordinary rice orλ = 0.1 for jasmine rice (WorldBank 2013). This largebuyer agentwasmodeled
to have all adequate capacity, δ = True, to process export-ready rice products.
4.7 Another contractor agent in the model – Contractor B in Table 3 – was setup with varied values in dierent
scenarios. The commitment in the contractual relationship was varied from being committed to being un-
trustworthy with 10%, 20%, and 30% of contracted participants. The rate λ was in the range [0.0, 0.05, 0.1,
0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3] for ordinary rice or [0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2] for jasmine variety. The buyer was modeled
either to equip with necessary husking, milling and polishing facilities, δ = True, or have no rice processing
capacity, δ = False, which requires the utilization of services from other supply chain actors with higher costs.
4.8 Dierent outputs reflecting the contract farming performance of contractor Bwould then be evaluated in dier-
ent combinations of scenarios. The simulationmodel calculates four output variables in each cropping season:
the rate of contracted farmers’ breaches, farmers’ trust in the contractor, exporting rice volume, and total profit
achieved by the contractor. The contract farming simulation ran separately with two rice varieties. Reported
results were calculated by averaging the 500 Monte Carlo trials.
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Parameter Contractor A Contractor B
Commitment level 0% [0%, 10%, 20%, 30%]
Higher oered rates for
ordinary rice 0.2 [0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3]
jasmine rice 0.1 [0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2]
Processing facilities True [True, False]
Table 3: Experimental settings of scenario-based parameter values
Analysis of results
Evolution of contract farming performance
4.9 Figure 6 shows the time-series evolution of contract farming performance with the dierent combinations of
scenarios for both ordinary and jasmine rice. The results of each rice variety include two separate experiments.
One experiment examined three scenarios in which fully committed contractors propose dierent paddy pur-
chasing prices. Another experiment involved the study of contractors, who all oer the typical rate λ = 0.2
with ordinary rice and λ = 0.1with jasmine rice, having varied commitment levels. All contractors in the above
settingswere set to be equippedwith adequate and suicient rice processing facilities, δ = True. Performance
of a buyer who completely trades over the openmarket was also included in the results.
4.10 The top two plots in Figure 6 represent the fact that high purchasing prices oered by a trustworthy contractor
could impede breaching behaviors from the participants (Eaton & Shepherd 2001; Prowse 2012;Will 2015). Both
ordinary and jasmine rice results show a significant decrease in farmer breaches with committed contractors
who set the highest rate especially when there are ‘jumps’ in the paddy prices over the openmarket (see Figure
5 for details). In the 6th crop for ordinary rice, less than 7% of contracted farmers under scenario λ = 20%
decide to sell to traders, while the rate of farmer breaches doubles at 14% with scenario λ = 10%. A similar
pattern can be seen in the 3rd crop in jasmine rice’s case.
4.11 Contractorswhopersist inbeing committed could sustainably establish long-term trust-based relationshipwith
theexistingparticipants. Farmers’ trust in thesecontractorsgrows rapidly in the first fewcropsandmaintainsan
increasing trend for all simulation runs. There are no significant dierences of the farmers’ trust in the trustwor-
thy contractors who proposed dierent contract rates. However, contractors with a higher oered purchasing
price achieve a higher volume of rice. In both ordinary and jasmine results, the contractors who advocate their
contracted farmers at λ = 20%, subsequently attain the targeted initial demand aer experiencing shortages
of rice supply due to farmer breaches at the early cropping seasons. The contractor with a lower paddy pur-
chasing price could not achieve k = 4000 tons of rice, since certain surrounding farmers consider their option
not as attractive as services from another large-scale buyer or the local collector.
4.12 Among scenarios of the same proposed contract farming rates, contractors with untrustworthy behavior lose
trust in the breached farmers and other neighboring farmers. There are downward trends of farmers’ trust in
those contractors who have the least commitment level, breaching 30% of the participants, in the results of
both rice types. Fewer farmers accept their proposals in the following crops, leading to a considerable decrease
of the total rice volume achieved through their large-scale program.
4.13 The results reported here are in agreementwith the existing evolutionary game theory literature on contractual
agreements fromboth experimental (Chen & Komorita 1994; Dannenberg et al. 2014) and theoretical (Han et al.
2015; Sasaki et al. 2015;Hanet al. 2017) perspectives, in that arrangingprior commitments leads toahigh level of
long-term beneficial cooperation. Contractors who are persistent to loan agricultural inputs, provide technical
support and acquire rice from the contract farming scheme at a predetermined price from contracted farmers
could significantly enhance trust from the participants as well as reduce the number of free-riders. However,
the level of prior commitment could also lead to dierent cooperation rates and interactions (Chen & Komorita
1994). In our results, trustworthy contractors with a more attractive purchasing price achieve a higher volume
of rice from the large-scale program and reduce the rate of farmer breaches.
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Figure 6: Time-series evolution of contract farming performance with both rice varieties
Viability of the contract farming scheme
4.14 Figure 7 shows the analysis of viability of the contract rice farming scheme from the perspective of large-scale
contractors. We firstly computed a ratio of average profit in all cropping seasons between the contractor and
spot market-based buyer to examine the profitability of the scheme. If the profit rate is larger than 1, the con-
tractors are performing better than the spot-market buyer. Otherwise, the contracting program is not a cost-
eective method in comparison with complete open-market trading. We also calculated the percentage of av-
erage rice volume achieved through the contracting program of the contractor’s initial demand k(t0) = 4000
tons. In eachheatmap, the y-axis describesdierent scenarios of contractor commitment θC = 0% (breach00),
θC = 10% (breach10), and θC = 30% (breach30), while the x-axis represents varied values of higher contract
farming rates over the spot market price.
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Figure 7: Comparison between fully-equipped contractors and spot market-based buyers
4.15 As shown in the top two heat maps of ordinary and jasmine rice, committed contractors could earn up to 89%
and 25% higher profits, respectively, than a buyer trading the same rice variety over the spot market. The con-
tractor with jasmine rice performs at a lower profit rate, since exporting prices of jasmine rice from the contract
farming scheme in the MKD region are only 2.45% higher than from the open market. Ordinary rice could be
sold to an international buyer at 9.5% higher if it is grown and harvested from the large-scale field program (see
Table 2 for details). However, jasmine rice could yield higher profit per ton of rice since it is of high-value in the
MKD region. The spot market-based buyer could obtain on average 3.43 billion VND per cropping season with
ordinary rice andmore than double at 8.54billion VNDwith jasmine rice (as shown in the bottomplots of Figure
6).
4.16 The simulation results also show that contractors who are untrustworthy to a relatively small portion, such
as 10%, of the participants, can still outperform the buyer from the open market in terms of profitability. If
contractors breach a large proportion of contracted farmers, they will not be as profitable as the spot market-
based trading, especially in the case of contract farming with ordinary rice. Besides that, the large-scale paddy
field program is considered not a cost-eective method for contractors when an unreasonably high contract
farming rate is oered. In the scenario of λ = 30%with ordinary rice, for example, the contractor incurs a high
transaction cost to buy paddy from the participants and that negatively impacts on their earnings.
4.17 For results related to the ordinary rice, the contractors earn themost profit when low contract farming rates are
oered to participating farmers. However, unattractive paddy purchasing prices result in the limitation in ex-
panding the contract farming scheme aswell as fewer small-holder farmers gaining benefits from the program.
The lower le heat map in Figure 7 indicates that if the contractors oer attractive contract farming prices at
rates (λ ranging from 20% to 30%) higher than the spot market price, more farmers are willing to participate
in the large-scale paddy field program. These contractors, especially those who are committed, eventually are
able to fulfill on average 96% of the total rice demand, even though they earn less profit compared to scenarios
in which lower contract rates are proposed. Dishonest contractors achieve a significantly lower rice volume,
particularly when unattractive purchasing prices (λ ranging from 0% to 10%) are oered or a large percentage
of contracted farmers (θC = 30%) are breached.
4.18 Similar observations can be seen on results related to the jasmine rice. Honest contractors withλ = 20% could
stably establish their relationshipwith farmers to attain 96%of themaximum required volume. The results also
show that contractors who are untrustworthy to 30% of the contracted farmers are still able to attain a certain
volume of rice through their scheme and outperform the spot market-based buyer in terms of profit. Since jas-
mine rice is of high productivity, the contractor could initiate agricultural contracts with newmembers among
the 3000 farmers initially setup in the model to fulfill their demand. As displayed in the top right heat map of
Figure 7, contractors with jasmine ricemight earn themost profit when they oer the typical rates currently set
in the MKD region, λ = 10%.
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Figure 8: Comparison between non-equipped contractors and spot market-based buyers
4.19 Figure 8 shows the profitability of contractors who are not equipped with rice processing facilities in their con-
tract farming scheme, in comparison with the open market-based buyer. The results indicate that the large-
scale field program with either ordinary or jasmine rice is not a cost-eective agricultural production method.
The profit acquired by exporting high-quality rice could not compensate the supporting services to contracted
farmers andoperational activities. Inmost of the scenarios, the incompetent performanceof contract rice farm-
ing leads tonon-viablebusiness for large-scale contractors anddiscourages themtocontinuewith theprogram.
Discussion and Future Work
5.1 In this paper, we presented an agent-based model to investigate three obstacles of the expansion of contract
rice farming in the MKD region from the perspective of large-scale contractors. We focused on financial incen-
tive and trust factors, which aect the decision of relevant parties in engaging and honoring the contracting
agreement. The simulation model was designed in the context of the MKD’s rice supply chain with two con-
tractors engaging in the contract rice farming scheme alongside with an openmarket in which both parties can
renege on the agreement. We then evaluated the performances of contractors with dierent combinations of
scenarios related to the three obstacles.
5.2 Firstly, regarding the failure in building a long-term trust-based relationship, our results showed a significant
reduction in the rice volume and profit achieved from the large-scale field program, if a contractor decides to
dishonor a large proportion of the participants. The results also uncovered an interesting observation when
the contractors choose to opportunistically break their contract with a relatively small proportion (e.g., 10%)
of small-holder farmers. In this case, they could still earnmore profit per crop than a spotmarket-based buyer.
This observationmight contribute to the explanation of the fact that contractors have been reported to renege
contract obligations especially when they could obtain the same type of rice at a lower price over the spot
market (Roberts & Khiem 2005; Dung 2014; UNIDROIT 2014; Vietnam Television 2017). While the Vietnamese
Government has introduced legal frameworks for contract farming, such as Decision 80 and Decision 62, they
need to be enforced eectively. The local authorities should be more proactive in establishing innovative ar-
bitration and dispute resolution mechanisms beyond the judicial system to prevent even the slightest level of
opportunistic behavior from related parties.
5.3 Secondly, thesimulation results showedthat fully-equippedcontractors couldsuccessfully implement the large-
scale paddy field program if they stay committed. Being trustworthy especially in the first few cropping seasons
could help the contractors quickly improve their trust-based relationship with members. Committed contrac-
tors proposing a higher price are able to expand the contract farming scheme with a larger volume of rice but
earn less profit per ton of rice. In contrast, contractors with a lower oer might obtain better earnings per ton
of rice aswell as higher profit in total per cropping season but they could not easily establish contractual agree-
ments with more farmers. The better financial incentives possibly discourage those contractors with a lower
paddy purchasing price to enlarge their large-scale model. Results here indicate that the contractors should
consider a flexible pricing system in order to adapt to fluctuations in spot market prices, production seasons
and crop values. This flexible price system,which canbeattractive for both the contractor and the farmer,might
lead to a more sustainable contracting program in the MKD’s rice supply chain.
5.4 Thirdly, we found that the contract farming scheme for both ordinary and jasmine rice is not a cost-eective
method for contractors who are not equipped with husking, processing and polishing machines. The higher
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cost they incur to transform paddy into export-ready rice by utilizing external services prevents them from en-
gaging in the contracting program. Our results are in agreement with the judgment of World Bank (2013). Since
most of the contractors in theMKD region have limited rice processing facilities (Tran et al. 2013), the large-scale
paddy fieldmodelmight not be adopted by themajority of enterprises and could not be expanded sustainably.
It is therefore necessary that contract farming is better integrated into government planning and budget al-
locations, to facilitate access to credit for large-scale contractors. They can can enhance their rice processing
capability and engage more eectively in the contracting program.
5.5 Additional experiments with four contractors and 6000 farmers showed that when more neighboring contrac-
tors exhibit untrustworthy behavior, a large buyer would be more tempted to lower the purchasing prices or
opportunistically exploit contracted farmers in order to obtain much better profits per crop. In both cases, the
contractors could still maintain their contract rice farming program and acquire up to an exporting volume of
around 89% during the whole simulation steps. For future work, we hope to extend the current study by vary-
ing the number of contractors with dierent commitment levels and oered purchasing prices to examine the
evolutionary dynamics of contract farming performance.
5.6 We also plan to integrate evolutionary game theory into our agent-based model in the near future. Instead of
assumingagentshaving suicient informationabout theenvironments tomakeanoptimaldecision inadvance,
we will model each agent with the ability to adapt their strategy through learning by imitation (Nowak & May
1992; Chiong & Kirley 2012). There are relevant studies (Han et al. 2015; Martinez-Vaquero et al. 2015; Han et al.
2017) looking into contractual commitments andproposingmechanisms to resolve cooperation issueswith the
use of evolutionary game theory. Wehope to apply the same framework andexaminewhether themechanisms
could help to diminish opportunistic behaviors in the context of MKD contract rice farming.
5.7 Crop yield and production cost data of the contract rice farming scheme used in this study was based on statis-
tics acquired from the An Giang Plant Protection Joint Stock Company. This company, which is a pioneer
and one of the few successful rice contractors, is considered the best scenario under the contract rice farming
scheme in the MKD region (World Bank 2013). Future research could focus on the variation in relevant param-
eter values of dierent companies or locations across the MKD region to further assess the performance of the
large-scale paddy field model. Dierences in model prediction could be validated by surveying local farmers
and contractors in the corresponding subregion or by interviewing experts.
5.8 Last but not least, this agent-basedmodel will be developed as a decision support system to evaluate enabling
policies from the Vietnamese Government and local authorities related to the rice supply chain and contract
farming in the MKD region. Similar decision supporting tools can be found in the work of Croitoru et al. (2014)
andMeddaetal. (2017). Dierentactivities including theGovernment’s landconsolidationprogramandsupport
from farmer organizations toward the emergence of a large-scale paddy field will be assessed to maintain a
sustainable contract farming model and improve the livelihood of millions of small-holder farmers in the MKD
region.
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Notes
1We also tested for [0.01, 1.0] and [0.1, 0.5], and the results did not change significantly.
2We also tested for [0.01, 0.99], and the results did not change significantly.
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